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Land problems in Colombia  




 The process of economic globalization has generated a new type of social exclusion, affecting 
local spaces in which a great number of vulnerable people have developed and maintained their own cus-
toms, habits and methods of production (see Iyotani 2002). Though this argument is not new, it is highly 
relevant when we look at today’s Colombian society.
 Colombia is a country with a history of more than fifty years of armed conflicts which have in-
volved different actors: leftist guerrilla movements, paramilitary right-wing groups and narcotic-funded 
self-defence groups. The local communities located in the areas where conflicts have taken place have 
been living in constant fear and suffering from shortages of basic needs, not only due to the presence of 
armed groups, but also due to the general absence of the State (in terms of provision of basic public ser-
vices). 
 Even though, since the end of 2006, the government began to emphasize “the development of the 
post-conflict era” as its central mission. The present Santos administration finally signed a peace agree-
ment with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the most persistent leftist guerrilla group) 
in 2016, which made definitive the post-conflict era. 
 The land problem was one of the most important issues during the peace-making dialogue 
and the topic of integral rural development was included as one of the six principal pillars of the political 
agenda in the peace agreement document. However, the present land policy still has many challenges and 
limitations. Peasants are now free of the threat of displacement by the armed conflict, but are equally vul-
nerable to the threat of losing their land due to possible land-grabbing either by the agricultural industry 
or through concessions for mining development projects backed by multinational (global) capital. What 
is worse, Colombian politics are already seeing campaigns for the coming congressional and presidential 
elections in 2018. Further, President Santos’ popularity has recently declined, and the opposition forces led 
by Alvaro Uribe2 have maintained their political influence. There is fear for the continuity of the Colombian 
peace-process and construction of a post-conflict society.
1  The paper prepared for the international symposium on “Re-examining Global Capitalism from the Perspective of Af-
ro-Japanese Relations: Land, Space and Modernity”, held at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, January 29, 2018. This 
paper is partly based on an article co-written with Colombian colleagues, Sergio Coronado, Flor Edilma Osorio and 
Nicolas Valgas (2014) and on Hataya (2016). The author’s analysis on the current land policy and its polemics after the 
peace-agreement with the FARC in 2016 was newly added. 
2  Ex-president, who held a strong “No” campaign against the Santos peace-making dialogue. 
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 This paper presents an argument concerning the causal relation between the land problems with 
Colombia’s long-lasting armed conflict. In today’s Colombian context, which is entering the post-conflict 
era, land problems continue to be one of the most challenging issues to be dealt with under the govern-
ment’s extractivist economic policy, which aims to make the country more competitive in the global mar-
ket. 
1. The Political Process under the Exclusionist Bipartisan Regime 
 Colombian political violence dates back to the initial period of the republican regime. Oligarchic 
groups, divided into two parties, the liberals and the conservatives, have dominated the Colombian politi-
cal scene since the coalition of these two parties was established in the 1960s3. Many authors describe the 
Colombian political process as an exclusionist bipartisan democracy managed by a coalition of the two tra-
ditional parties (Kline, 1999; Livingstone, 2003). The leftist wing, the communist party and a radical group 
of liberals have struggled for a more egalitarian society and pluralistic political regime, which led to the 
emergence of leftist armed groups. 
 The FARC is historically the oldest organization among the leftist guerrillas in Colombia. Commu-
nism had a strong philosophical influence on its founders, who promoted Marxism–Leninism. It is said that 
FARC had close to 30,000 combatants at its peak.
 The expansion of paramilitarism during the 1990s also contributed to the intensification of armed 
resistance of the FARC and the ELN (National Liberation Army), another radical leftist-guerrilla group. 
Particularly, since the formation of the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), ordinary civilians 
suspected of having contact with left-wing guerrillas, such as community leaders and social movement or-
ganizers in rural areas, had become targets of repression and massacres. Many farmers, unable to remain 
neutral in the conflict due to the worsening of political violence and the simultaneous presence of the state 
military, paramilitaries, and left-wing guerrillas in rural areas, were driven off or forcibly removed from 
their land. An estimated six million rural residents suffered this fate.
 During the 1990s, as drug cartels declined in strength because they were pursued by government 
authorities, the FARC obtained capital for its activities by assisting the drug trade, and by this way, expand-
ed its area of control in the rural sector. However, it also caused the FARC to begin straying from its origi-
nal foundation in revolutionary philosophy and instead to take on the role of “narcotic guerrillas.” 
2. The national strategy for peace building after the 1980s
 The government began to address peace policy seriously starting with the Betancur administra-
tion. However, throughout the 20th century, the peace negotiation efforts remained at a complete impasse. 
President Uribe reversed course with a hawkish stance and forced the FARC into military decline through 
all-out resistance and a military build-up.
 President Santos, after his administration took over in 2010 shifted to a more negotiation-focused 
position, away from the hawkish stance, toward Colombia’s leftist guerrillas, which in turn brought a 
long-awaited change in the deadlocked peace process. After that, former-president Uribe, who had sought 
3  This is the Spanish term for the political structure, “Frente Nacional”, which took effect in 1958. This was a system of di-
vided rule based on an agreement between the Conservative and Liberal parties, under which the presidency alternated 
between Conservatives and Liberals every 4 years for the next 16 years. Seats in the Congress and governorships were 
also divided between the two parties.
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to achieve peace through all-out resistance to the guerrillas, broke from his political allies and formed the 
Centro Democrático Party in 2013. Since then, there has been a partisan split in national politics between 
Uribe’s faction and the ruling party. 
 Initial negotiations between FARC commanders and government representatives began in Oslo in 
October 2012, and it was agreed to continue negotiations toward a peace agreement in Havana, Cuba.
 The Santos administration managed to draft a peace agreement, as part of its peace-building 
agenda, more than 4 years later, following a ceasefire. The details of the agreement drafted in Havana were 
noteworthy and did not only aim to build a post-conflict society but also addressed the reintegration of 
FARC fighters into the society following the end of hostilities, compensation for victims of the conflict, and 
the reconciliation of civilians. In addition, it promoted a political agenda related to structural problems in 
Colombia, such as the need to transform its political system into a more pluralistic democracy, the delayed 
development of rural areas (especially as related to land issues), and disparate social stratification that 
was a major cause of the armed conflict. Consequently, the agreement was a valuable document. However, 
support for the Santos administration was low, and an increased distrust or a lack of interest in the peace 
process among citizens, especially those in urban areas, had become apparent. 
 The peace agreement survived with some modifications, after some ups and downs due to a re-
jection by a national referendum, and finally was approved by the Congress at the end of November 2016. 
After a series of disturbances, the peace agreement put the disarmament process into practice at the very 
end of that year. 
Table 1: The Peace Process as Pursued by Successive Administrations
Year Name of Administration Major Policies and Results
1982–1986 Belisario Betancur  
(Conservative Party)
Undertook peace negotiations with FARC, which broke down in 1987
1986–1990 Virgilio Barco  
(Liberal Party)
Announced a “War on Drugs” against terrorist drug trafficking organiza-
tions
1990–1994 César Gaviria  
(Liberal Party)
Convened a constitutional convention, disarmed major guerrilla organi-
zations such as the M-19, and expanded paramilitary groups; deadlock in 
meeting at Tlaxcala (Mexico)
1994–1998 Ernesto Samper  
(Liberal Party)
Corruption problems with the presidential election came to light; no prog-
ress with peace policy
1998–2002 Andrés Pastrana  
(Conservative Party)
Failure of negotiations at San Vicente del Caguán
2002–2010 Álvaro Uribe  
(2 terms) 
(Colombia First Party)
Built up the military and developed “all-out resistance” line. Collectively 
disarmed paramilitaries. Established the 2005 Justice and Peace Law and 
the Comisión Nacional de Reparaciones y Reconciliación
2010–2018 Juan Manuel Santos  
(2 terms) 
(National Unity Party)
Enacted the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law; reopened lines of 
negotiation. Created agreement with FARC (August 2016) through peace 
negotiations in Havana, Cuba. “No” vote in national referendum. Ap-
proved new agreement by Congress (November 2016)
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
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3. Land laws and land problems in Colombia 
3–1. The national context of land concentration and armed conflict until the 
1990s
 Colombia has maintained a historically concentrated structure of land ownership, which has be-
come more extreme as a result of the war. The war provoked forced displacement from the land with few 
opportunities for return. In highly vulnerable conditions, displaced people are forced to take on precarious 
employment in which they are exposed to new types of exploitation. The impact of the war on the agrarian 
structure should be seen in the context of a development model exclusively focused on certain social class-
es and which tends to concentrate wealth through increased efficiency and access to international markets. 
As a consequence, rural populations have become increasingly impoverished (Osorio and Herrera 2012).
 The rural sector has been besieged by legal and illegal investments of four types: agro-industri-
al companies (especially palm oil and timber), investments in illicit crops, extensive cattle ranching and 
companies in the mining and energy sector. This entire process takes place through relationships between 
those who control the resources and those who provide labour at very low cost, whether in the rural or ur-
ban sectors, which benefits the large-scale companies (Fajardo 2006). 
 Inequity in access to land constitutes one of the most important objective outcomes of the armed 
conflict, as it generates social exclusion and inequality (Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia 1987). 
The economic power of land generates political and social benefits, which in turn provide economic returns 
for broadening economic power. The bipolarised agrarian structure as well as limited economic growth in 
the rural sector has impeded the Colombian government from responding satisfactorily to demands for 
access to land. As a consequence, the historically persistent concentration of rural property reached a Gini 
coefficient of 0.86 (Ibáñez and Muñoz 2012: 301). 
3–2.  Subsoil concessions for resource extraction under the “mining boom” in 
the global market 
 The awarding of concessions can lead to the expropriation of land, or impede the recognition 
of rights to land already inhabited and used by the rural population. In this way, between 1990 and 2010, 
around 10 million hectares of concessions were granted for mining activities, and applications were re-
ceived for concessions on another 26 million hectares (CGR 2011). 
  This situation should be analysed against the current “mining boom”, which emerged with in-
creased demand in the global market, especially in relation to coal, gold and platinum. Colombia is a coun-
try gifted with rich petroleum and mineral resources. It is the leading producer of coal in South America, 
accounting for more than 80 per cent of the region’s total production and is also an important gold produc-
er, ranking as the fifth largest in the region. Finally, the country is the only producer of platinum group 
metals in South America, and is the largest producer of nickel and ferronickel in the world. Thus, there is 
strong global interest in Colombia’s minerals (British Geological Survey 2016).
3–3. Post-conflict scenario: attraction of foreign investment to Colombia 
 Uncertainty in terms of public security has been one of the greatest barriers to foreign investors 
interested in Colombian mining deposits. After Uribe became president, security improved if one analyses 
it through conventional statistics or indicators, such as the level of “violence” (for example, the number of 
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homicides per 10,000 persons, or the number of kidnappings). Disarmament of major paramilitary groups 
and social rehabilitation programs for ex-guerrilla or paramilitary combatants served to publicize an image 
that Colombia is now recovering its security. And the peace agreement signed between the Santos adminis-
tration and the FARC secured even more the attraction for global extractivist capital.
 In 2001, after long polemical debates on reform, a new mining code was established with the pas-
sage of Law 685. The reform of the mining code had the aim of promoting competition of private capital, 
and particularly of bringing foreign multinational investment to the mining sector. The new mining code 
deregulated state control over access to land with potential mineral deposits and facilitated the procedure 
of giving concessions to private capital. 
  With the solution of these two problematic issues, major mining multinationals have increased 
their presence in Colombia over the last two decades. Exploration concessions have been given for most of 
the land where there are expected to be mining deposits.
  At the same time, the government’s fundamental mission is to support and qualify small-scale 
mining operations, which make up the majority of all miners. Small-scale mining operations apply the ar-
tisanal, traditional system of production with a low level of production, almost at the subsistence level. The 
government aims to formalize and integrate all existing small and mid-sized mining operations under the 
category of Mining Districts in order to facilitate its control over them. 
  There is one sensitive issue that has not yet been resolved. Small-scale mining communities are 
legally vulnerable when the area in which they have settled happens to be a part of the land for which a 
multinational enterprise requests a concession. Without a title deed for the land, the community has no 
other alternative but to move out. 
 Both these tendencies: intensification of land-concentration for large scale production (as repre-
sented by palm-oil production) and increased interest in mining exploitation by multinational capital, have 
marginalized family farming of traditional food production for subsistence and increased Colombia’s food 
dependency on imports. Statistics for 2010 show a significant level of food dependency in Colombia: rice 
imports have increased by 64.4 per cent, corn 67.3 per cent, barley 35.6 per cent and wheat 21.1 per cent. 
Meanwhile, crops such as palm oil, cocoa and fruit have had their production boosted by policies oriented 
towards competitiveness in exportable tropical products (López 2012). The government’s shift in priority 
from food production for the domestic market towards export-oriented agricultural industry has had neg-
ative effects on income generation and therefore morale in productive activities. This has led to land sales, 
changes in land use and migration of peasants, hitherto engaged in small-and medium-scale farming, to 
cities, diminishing their traditional contribution to the internal food market. 
3–4. Measures employed by the state and their scope
State efforts at agrarian reform with a limited scope
 In Colombia, policies and normative frameworks related to land ownership have proved to be 
insufficient in addressing the concentration of land ownership and changing the inequitable agrarian struc-
ture. Rather than redistributing land, the agricultural frontier has been extended to the south and east of 
the country (Ramírez 1981: 203). 
 In the 1980s, the government adopted a productive strategy designed to modernise zones in 
which the peasant economy predominated. Governmental actions regarding land were limited to the incor-
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poration of new zones at the agrarian frontier. Productive efficiency, in the context of a process of opening 
up the Colombian economy, was intensified at the beginning of the 1990s. The current legal framework 
(Law 160 of 1994) is intended to consolidate a land-rights market approach, which was derived from the 
emergence of new land disputes and conflicts.
Lack of formalisation of land rights in rural areas 
 The basic procedure for registering land, including the clarification of whether property is pub-
lic or private and the delimitation of land boundaries, has been delayed all over the country. There is an 
evident lack of formalisation of land rights in rural areas: 47.7 per cent of landowners do not have formal 
property titles, and the situation is even more critical for small landholders (Gáfaro et al. 2012). Some of 
these problems relate to the lack of clarity around property titles in much of the country, a backlog at the 
land registry office, the high costs of registry transactions and rural property legalisation, uncertainty over 
property and the lack of clear and definitive delimitation of which lands are public and which private, espe-
cially in places such as marshlands, riverbanks and communally used plains. All of this makes the process 
of identifying and reclaiming property difficult. 
Table 2. Colombian agrarian reform laws
Name and year Characteristics 
Law 200 in 1936 This law created the concept of the social function of land, meaning that land should be 
distributed to landless peasants, specifically those occupying wilderness land. One of the main 
ideas of this law was to recognize the ownership of the land by the peasants working and 
living on it. 
Law 100 in 1944 The purpose of this law was to avoid the land distribution effect caused by the previous land 
law. This law created barriers against peasants claiming their property rights, by enforcing 
land rights such as possession and tenure instead of property rights in favor of landless peas-
ants. 
Law 161 in 1961 This law was the result of the commitment of the national elite to the distribution of land to 
landless peasants. The policy created by this law laid the foundation for the National Institute 
of Colombia for the Agrarian Reform (Incora) and several institutions and norms, with the 
main purpose of giving land to peasants, and recognizing and formalizing property rights. 
Law 4 in 1974 Also known as the ‘Chicoral Pact’ (named after a province ruled by the landlords at that time). 
This law was the result of a negotiation between the state and regional elites, and its purpose 
was to restrain the progress of the agrarian reform law of the 1960s, since agrarian reform was 
assumed to be a threat to their political and economic power. 
Law 160 in 1994 The 1990s amendment of the agrarian reform law implied a shift from the state-oriented 
land policy to the establishment of a land market supported by the state. Despite this, the law 
also created Peasant Reserve Zones to protect access to land by peasants in wilderness areas, 
established limits to private titles to wilderness lands and recognized the territorial rights of 
indigenous and afro-descendant communities. 
Sources: Machado 2004, 2017.
3–5. A new perspective in the current peace process: The last legal frame-
works introduced during the Santos administration and the respective 
polemics
 The decision to resume the peace dialogue between the government of the Santos administra-
tion and the FARC in 2012 put the issues of land concentration and deprivation back in the public arena. 
Although “integral rural development” was one of the principal themes of the peace agreement, up to the 
present, it has been very difficult to identify a change in attitude (or political will, or position of the political 
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leadership) of policymakers in relation to the land issue and respective policies.
The Land Restitution Law (1448/2011)
 This Law is an important step towards the reparation and recognition of the rights of victims of 
the Colombian armed conflict (Bautista 2012; Uprimny and Sanchez 2010). Its purpose is not to redistrib-
ute land, but to repair and restore the rights of the victims of recent violence in the country. It is possible to 
see that the law has an important background in several international human rights instruments, such as 
the Deng Principles and the Pinheiro Principles. Nevertheless, several aspects of the law have been criti-
cised as follows:
1)  Restriction on the category of victims. Only those who suffered displacement and dispossession 
after 1991 are recognised. This creates an obstacle for those who were victimised in previous pe-
riods, and it clearly forms a limit to the human rights approach of the policy. 
2)  Limitations on property within the scope of restitution. The law established that only land can be 
restored, not property, houses, crops, farm animals or other possessions lost by victims. Over-
coming this problem will depend on the enforcement of complementary policies, such as the pro-
vision of housing, rural development and technical support to the victims. 
 3)  Inclusion of measures that limit the possibility of restitution. Article 99 stipulates that a restitution 
judge can establish a legal contract between the victim, as the owner of the restored plot, and the 
current users of the land only if the current users prove their innocence with regard to the origi-
nal circumstances in which the land was seized, in which case they can continue to use the land. 
  Despite these problems, this Law is the current legal framework for reparation and the restitution 
of the rights of approximately 8 million victims in the country. By the end of November 2017, the Land Res-
titution Unit had received 109,902 requests from victims to be included in the National Register of Aban-
doned and Dispossessed Land, and these requests covered an area of 2,368,908 hectares4. 
  The successful enforcement of this Law is greatly dependent on the capacity of the state to concil-
iate the interests of the national elite, who are interested in land restitution and the consolidation of a land 
market, and the many regional elites who see this policy as a threat. For the national elite, creating a dy-
namic land market through formalisation of the land tenure system is one of the indispensable conditions 
for providing security and encouraging foreign investment. The regional elites, however, see land restitu-
tion as a land distribution policy which would affect their power that is founded on land concentration. 
  It is important to note that the land restitution process is regulated by a temporary legislation 
(which will be valid until 2021). The procedure has not progressed as expected, because it requires sev-
eral stages of document verification, and over 30 percent of demands are rejected before getting to the 
final stage. In some local areas where the presence of armed conflict was very serious and complex, many 
leaders of peasant organisations who claimed dispossessed land were subjected to intimidation, including 
death threats.
The ZIDRES Law (Law 1776 of 2016)
 Just after its approval at the congress, the Law to regulate ZIDRES (zones of interest for economic 
and social rural development) became the focus of criticism by opposition parties such as Polo and Alianza 
4  https://www.restituciondetierras.gov.co/es/restitucion, accessed on January 10, 2018. 
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Verde, who argued that this law could almost completely undermine locals’ peasant life and their economy. 
 According to the law, ZIDRES should be developed in areas far from urban centres, where the 
land requires considerable investment to prepare for cultivation and production. This would therefore al-
low that people pretending to run a ZIDRES project could request the land in a concession, or could lease 
national baldío (virgin land)5. In the legal framework of the ZIDRES, the government stated that the proj-
ects in question could provide more than 7 million hectares for food production, given the conditions of 
protecting forest resources and creating decent (well-paying) job in the countryside. 
 For the plaintiff in the case against the ZIDRES law, the fact that developers of a productive proj-
ect could access national baldío land is itself a regression in terms of the right of peasants to access the 
land, and also a violation against public resources, since the use of such land for development projects has 
been restricted. They also suggest that in ZIDRES projects, peasants could lose their autonomy in terms 
of land use and management, and in terms of their own (peasant and family farming) productive projects, 
and therefore, their identification as local agents based in their own territory would be at risk. The cultural 
and traditional identity of the peasant economy has been protected by the Constitution, but in the ZIDRES 
law, there is no reference to the identity of the peasantry. Additionally, the Law overlooks the right to hold 
a prior consultation ahead of any development project, which has been guaranteed to ethnic groups (indig-
enous and Afro-descendent communities) and to victims of the armed conflicts who are in the process of 
land restitution6.
The legal Bill for the New Land Law (to reform the current Law 160/1994)
 The official statement of the government in justifying this Bill was to provide a normative frame-
work to deal with the first pillar of the peace agreement with the FARC, namely that of promoting “integral 
rural development”. The Bill is now being reviewed and discussed by the members of CSIVI (The Com-
mission for Follow-up, Impulse and Verification on the Implementation of the Final Agreement). 
 Peña & Parada (2017) pointed out the following aspects of the legal Bill of the new land Law as 
problematic and contradictory to the peace agreement: 
1)  The new Law will establish the system of Register of Subjects for Legal Order (Registro de Sujetos 
de Ordenamiento: RESO), which classifies and prioritises persons who shall be the beneficiaries 
of the land policy.
2)  It will modify the concept of the UAF (Unit of Agrarian Family)7 and eliminate the (concept of) 
“families” as the basis for the land distribution policy, since in the new legal framework the con-
cept of the “beneficiaries” (individual persons) shall replace them. 
3)  The new Law permits that other individuals (or subjects) than the vulnerable (poor) people may 
acquire the land in the category of “baldío” by paying for it.
4)  The law also modifies the Civil Code and establishes real surface (land) rights, which allow the 
5 This concept refers to land which used to be virgin soil and under the control of the State. In theory, baldío land is not 
private property and in general is located beyond the frontier of agrarian exploitation or arable land. However, for their 
survival, landless peasants have occupied baldío land as colons and have developed the virgin soil. Most of them never 
claimed a title deed, as they have not intended to pay tax. However, once they are at risk of disposition of the land or 
forced displacement, the legal status of their occupied land becomes vulnerable. 
6 For the further analysis on ZIDRES, see (Machado 2017).
7 UAF has been the basis for agrarian policy in Colombia for promoting the development of family farming.
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transference of the rights of use and disposition of the land for productive projects, without trans-
ferring the ownership of the same lands. 
 In respect of these points, many civil society organisations and some congressmen have pointed 
out that the new land Law would encourage land concentration through the accumulation of baldíos, which, 
after all would legitimize land disposition from landless peasants, or in other words, from peasants who 
have occupied land without a title deed. The new land Law will also permit the acquisition of land occupied 
by ethnic communities (indigenous or Afro-descendent people) without completing the required prior 
consultations with these groups, as regulated by the Constitution. The new land Law shall also eliminate 
the few existing mechanisms of guaranteeing land access with the aim of protecting peasant rights on the 
land (such as Peasant Reserve Zones, and Collective land for Afro-descendent communities) (Peña & 
Parada, 2017). 
  These critical comments on the Bill for new land Law suggest that it would deregulate land use, 
which could cause more land concentration for large-scale agricultural industry projects. As Peña & Prada 
pointed out as a concern, in the new land legal framework, baldíos could be exploited by agricultural in-
dustry companies without transferring title deeds. For the small farmers who are not able to invest in their 
land to improve productivity, offering their land use rights to third parties could be an attractive option. 
However, given all of the above, the question might not be only about the concentration of land tenancy but 
the change in land use, which may result in risks to food security and to the sustainability of the peasant 
economy and family farming. 
 To make the things worse, some conditions required by the RESO system will impede landless 
and vulnerable peasants from accessing their lands. Under the RESO system, in theory, the most vulner-
able subjects (peasants) have priority, but in practice, the projects on which most landless peasants base 
their claims to land tenancy or formalisation of their title free of charge shall not necessarily be prioritised 
over other productive projects. Deregulation of baldío land acquisition through payment will clearly favour 
entities with agricultural industry projects that are able to pay more than 500 legal minimum salaries in 
return. Vulnerable peasants cannot afford to compete for land tenancy under such conditions. The current 
constitutional mandate regulated in the current Law 160/1994 prioritises the use of baldío land for vulner-
able peasants to improve their living conditions; therefore, the national government’s political interest is 
to reform Law 160 in order to “recover national baldío land” for agricultural industry projects, which is the 
real intention for the national economic development policy. 
Final remarks: How to understand the land problem and long-lasting 
armed conflict in Colombia given the expansion of global capital?
  This paper reaffirmed that the land problem in terms of land concentration and extreme inequal-
ity in terms of land access has been the principal cause of the armed conflict in Colombia. The emergence 
of illegal armed groups in the 1960s in Colombia was influenced by the international circumstances in the 
Americas then, but social and economic segregation and the fight for land use by the vulnerable population 
has historical origins going back to the colonial period when the structure of the concentrated land tenure 
system was established. 
  The land problem has continued without an effective solution due to the so-called exclusionist po-
litical bipartisan regime, which, in turn, intensified the conflict over land access. Thus, until the 1990s, the 
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evolution of land problems and armed conflict was basically determined by internally-structured political 
and socio-economic factors in Colombia. 
  After the end of the Cold War and since the 1990s, the balance of world power changed and glo-
balisation proceeded rapidly in terms of market liberalisation and increased mobility of goods, services, 
finance and human resources. This process soon built a new hegemony of multinational capital which has 
gained the greatest power in the global market. During this period, some South American countries saw 
the emergence of leftist government regimes (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil), who 
claimed a political position of anti-Americanism and anti-hegemonic globalisation. In Colombia, there also 
was an increased momentum of seeking a more pluralistic democratic regime. However, the emerging left-
ist political party failed to build a majority political faction, while the leftist guerrilla groups lost their ideo-
logical backing to justify regular military activities. During this period, the guerrilla groups transformed 
into so-called “narco-guerrillas”, taking advantage of the cocaine boom in Colombia.
  Following the globalisation era, the persistence of armed conflict connected with land concentra-
tion in Colombia should be analysed more clearly from the point of view of the economic interests of global 
capital and of those (other internal actors) who benefit from the market mechanism of globalisation.
  This is the reason why the armed conflict in Colombia lasted so long. While a war is ongoing, 
there is a part of society that profits from it, and this weakens the political will to end it. The government 
continued to neglect the peasant economy and their distressed conditions, because it was more convenient 
for the political elite class to provide humanitarian aid to displaced persons in the cities, leaving the rural 
sector without a subsistent peasant economy.
  This tendency continued through the succeeding decades during the Uribe administration, but 
Colombia is now finally entering into a genuinely “post-conflict” era. As analysed in this presentation, 
however, land problems continue to be amongst the most challenging issues to be addressed as part of the 
government’s intention to promote extractivist economic development.
  With the ceasefire, peasant communities and ethnic groups recovered a temporary calm in their 
daily lives, but this does not guarantee their livelihoods. As we have reviewed, after the disarmament of the 
FARC, new “legitimate” actors, such as national and/or multinational companies have intervened in these 
communities (or local territories) with the threat of dispossessing them of their land, so as to explore the 
baldío land for export-oriented crops or subsoil mineral resources.
  After the 1990s (more precisely, after the establishment of the Constitution in 1991), landless 
peasants (or colons), indigenous groups and Afro-descendent communities have counted on certain legal 
frameworks to protect their livelihood, such as the ZRC (Peasant Reserve Zones), and the right of prior 
consultation before any development project by an external party. The political agenda signed in the peace 
agreement with the FARC emphasizes the government mandate to promote “integral rural development”, 
even though the existing mechanisms to protect the rights of the vulnerable population have been totally 
ignored or not recognised at all in the recent new legal framework related to land. On the contrary, the bill 
for the new land law clearly pretends to “adjust” the existent legal framework in order to meet the govern-
ment’s interests, and thus the interests of global capital. 
   I would like to conclude this paper by pointing out a series of issues of concern for the future:
1)  The national government policy to promote the agricultural industry and cooperatives as a mecha-
nism of job creation for landless peasants will definitely increase food insecurity in the country.
2)  Accumulation of baldío land for large-scaled productive projects for export-oriented crops would 
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aggravate environmental destruction and destroy eco-systems in areas destined to be protected 
for their biodiversity, such as Llanos Orientales and the Orinoco, where the ZIDRES projects are 
being planned.
3)   If the current trajectory proceeds, sooner or later the peasant economy will disappear. The peas-
ant cultural identity, which is rooted in their territory, will be lost. Although their economic condi-
tions might improve to a certain extent in terms of monetary value, they will not be able to build 
social agency and autonomy in the local territory. 
4)  Given these problematic issues, how can the political agenda promised in the peace agreement 
progress appropriately, particularly within the current electoral campaign? 
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